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CONCENTRATIONS
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC COMPETITION
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
RELEVANT CASES
LIC. RAFAEL VALDIS-ABASCAL*
INTRODUCTION
In the middle eighties, Mexico initiated a structural reform based on free trade as
an instrument for the economic development. The reform, which reached its peak
in the 88-94 administrative period, included a series of measures such as the
elimination of price controls, the privatization of state-owned companies, the
liberalization of international trade and foreign investments, and the implementation
of an ambitious deregulatory program. Among the measures comprehended in the
reform, one of the most important was the creation of a legal and institutional
framework for the effective development of an economic competition policy.
Notwithstanding the fact that since 1857 existed a Constitutional norm
prohibiting monopolies, also adopted by the 1917 Mexican Constitution, in effect
at present, it was not until the late 1992, when the most serious effort to effectively
enforce the Constitutional norm took place, through the enactment of the Federal
Law of Economic Competition (hereinafter LFCE by its acronym in Spanish), by
means of conceptualizing the antitrust policy as an instrument to promote
competition through a series of legal provisions which allow challenging
monopolistic practices, prevent and penalize concentrations in restraint of trade and
enhancing a general legal framework which eliminates restrictions to the efficient
operation of markets, among other actions.
Prior to the economic reform, the State actions headed towards the
implementation of the Constitutional norm referred to above, had been aimed to
counter the effects of monopolies by means of price control and the involvement of
the State as an economic agent in numerous sectors of the industry, instead of to
challenge said monopolies.
The LFCE, reckoned as one of the most modern ordinances on economic
competition, allots important consideration to setting the legal rules under which
unions among economic entities, referred to by the aforementioned ordinance as
concentrations, are to be executed in order to secure an environment of competition
within domestic markets.
Due to the novel features of the LFCE, a complete understanding of the
provisions contained therein generally, and concretely those regarding
concentrations, has purported a process of interpretation and experimentation by
means of which the scope and limits of the referred dispositions have been truly
defined.
* Is founding partner of Valdds Abascal y Brito Anderson, S.C., since 1996.
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The purpose of this work is to provide a wide overview of the legal framework
governing concentrations, exposing certain opinions on the insufficiency of diverse
legal provisions and on the adequate criteria for its interpretation, as well as the
proposal, in its case, of the amendments which, upon the experience derived from
the practical application of the LFCE, I consider convenient to adopt in order to
achieve a higher efficacy in the accomplishment of its objectives.'
Hence, a general overview of the constitutional principles which set the grounds
for an economic competition policy and the rules deriving therefrom is exposed,
followed by an analysis of the rules governing concentrations including the
methodology to determine whether these concentrations diminish, harm or hinder
competition and free concurrence, the corresponding penalties and the procedures
to impose and appeal them. Finally, some relevant cases are presented in order to
exemplify the manner in which the legal framework examined throughout this work
operates, as well as to expose how practical cases have been the basis for the
creation of criteria which has been, in certain cases, later adopted in the Federal
Law of Economic Competition Regulation (hereinafter RLFCE by its acronym in
Spanish) and to depict some of the situations which sustain certain amendment
proposals included within this document.
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Article 28 of the prevailing Mexican Constitution sets the foundations for an
economic competition policy and although it has been amended in various occasions
since its enactment in 1917, its first two paragraphs, transcribed hereunder, remain
essentially unchanged:
"ARTICLE 28. In the Mexican United States the monopolies, the monopolistic
practices, the state monopolies [estancos] and the tax exemptions are
prohibited in the terms set by the laws. The same treatment shall be given to
every prohibition raised under the protection of the industry.
"As a consequence, the law shall severely punish and the authorities shall
prosecute with efficacy, every concentration or hoard in one or few hands of
primary consumer goods and having the purpose of raising prices; every
agreement, procedure or combination among producers, industrials, merchants
or service entrepreneurs, that in any way purports to avoid free concurrence or
competition between themselves and compelling consumers to pay exaggerated
prices and, in general, everything which constitutes an unlawful exclusive
advantage in favor of one or many determined persons and in detriment of the
general public or a specific social class."
Since 1917, the legislative branch has issued several ordinances in order to regulate
the constitutional norm cited above, nonetheless it is not until 1992 when the most
important of the administrative efforts aimed towards the enhancement of a modern
free trade regulation took place which was reflected in the enactment of the LFCE.2
1. The proposed amendments and correspondingjustifications contained in this paper are part of a broader
reform package drafted by the author as a consequence of the counseling rendered to the Mexican Federal
Regulatory Improvement Commission. and might be also published, in part or in whole, by such agency, at any time
as of the fourth quarter of 2000.
2. The LFCE was published in the Federal Official Gazette on December 24, 1992 becoming effective on
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According to the LFCE, Article 23,3 the CFC, an administrative agency of the
Ministry of Commerce, is to be in charge of enforcing the economic competition
policy. The rules governing the administrative operation of the CFC, are compiled
in its internal regulation,4 which together with certain provisions of the LFCE, set
its structure. In this regard, the governance organ of the CFC is a Board of
Commissioners, in charge of the decision-making processes, integrated by five
Commissioners including its President, all of them appointed by the Mexican
President. The operative and administrative coordination is under the responsibility
of an Executive Secretary.
The personal jurisdiction of the CFC, as established in the LFCE, article 3,
reaches all persons regardless of their legal nature, including departments and
entities of the Federal Government, professionals guilds, trusts or any other entity
participating in the economic activity.5 Materially, the scope of activities of the CFC
extends to every area of the economic activity and concerns the protection of
competition and free concurrence by preventing and eliminating monopolies,
monopolistic practices and any other restraint against the efficient operation of the
goods and services markets. Given that the LFCE is a Federal ordinance, the spatial
jurisdiction of the CFC extends to all the economic activity having effects within
national territory.
According to the LFCE and other ordinances governing regulated markets such
as telecommunications, naval ports, airports, railroads and natural gas, among
others, the main object of the CFC may be briefed in: (i) preventing, challenging
and penalizing absolute and relative monopolistic practices and concentrations in
restraint of trade; (ii) promoting a general legal framework in accordance with the
economic competition policy; (iii) fomenting competition in regulated markets, and
(iv) investigate conducts in restraint of interstate trade.
For what concerns concentrations, the subject of analysis of the present
document, the LFCE, provides the definition of concentrations and qualifies those
which are to be deemed in restraint of trade, the procedures to prevent, challenge
and penalize them, the penalties imposed by the CFC and the procedures to appeal
its decisions.6
On March 4, 1998 the RLFCE, an ordinance issued by the Mexican President,
was published in the Federal Official Gazette, to become effective the day after. The
main purpose of the RLFCE is to clarify and elaborate on certain aspects of the
LFCE, in order to provide for a better understanding and enforcement of the rules
contained therein.
June 21, 1993, abrogating all preceding dispositions opposing its contents, as expressly provided by Transitory
Articles One and Three, respectively.
3. "Article 23: The Federal Competition Commission is an administrative and deconcentrated organ of
the Ministry of Commerce. It is to be technically and operatively autonomous and it is to be responsible for
preventing, investigating and contesting monopolies, monopolistic practices and concentrations in accordance with
this law and it is to be autonomous in issuing its resolutions."
4. The Internal Regulation of the CFC "Reglanento Interior de la Comisidn Federal de Competencia"
was published in the Diario Oficial on October 12, 1993 to become effective the day after its publishing.
5. Throughout the entire body of the LFCE and the RLCE, the persons participating in the economic
activity are named economic agents.
6. The investigation procedure and the administrative procedure to appeal the decisions of the CFC are
enforced to challenge and penalize both monopolistic practices and concentrations in restraint of trade and to
challenge the decisions issued in connection with said conducts, respectively.
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Even though some of the provisions of the RLFCE, according to their nature and
scope ought to be contained in the LFCE, situation which could rise constitutional
issues regarding the legal enforcement of said provisions, it is preferable to have
norms which might be challenged, than to lack the existence of a legal framework
setting the boundaries within which the authority is empowered to act. An example
of this is the establishment in the RLFCE of specific timeframes which constrain
the terms in which the CFC is to act, thus increasing the legal certainty of the
persons acting before said authority. In this regard, it is also important to point out,
that only the persons affected by an act of the authority derived from the RLFCE,
are the ones entitled to exercise the right to challenge its validity. The authority is
not empowered to challenge the validity of the RLFCE and it is compelled to fulfill
the provisions set therein.
An additional legal source, issued in order to comply with the mandate set in the
RLFCE, article 13,' on July 24, 1998 the CFC published on the Federal Official
Gazette, its resolution on the methodology for the calculation of the indices to
determine the degree of concentration in the relevant market and the criteria for its
application.
In addition to the ordinances and rules cited above, the CFC has issued diverse
not-binding criteria disclosing its views and interpretations on aspects deemed
unclear or ambiguous, as well as on certain fine points on its day-to-day operation.
This criteria has been compiled, primarily, in the Annual Reports issued by the
aforementioned authority, in which some cases deemed important have been also
published. Notwithstanding, since the enactment of the RLFCE, all the decisions
adopted by the CFC, as well as its criteria, are to be periodically published in an
internal gazette and an abstract of them shall be published in the Federal Official
Gazette.
THE CONCEPT OF CONCENTRATION
In order to analyze the concept of concentration to its full extent it is convenient
to review the parts relevant to such figure within the first two paragraphs of Article
28 of the Constitution:
"Article 28. In the Mexican United States the monopolies.., are prohibited...
"As a consequence, the law shall severely punish and the authorities shall
prosecute with efficacy, every concentration or hoard in one or few hands of
primary consumer goods and having the purpose of raising prices;..."
It is possible to understand the aforementioned rules in the sense that the concept
of concentration should equal the concept of hoard, which in the specific case is
immediately branded by "...in one or few hands of primary consumer goods....,
making it feasible to assume that a concentration must imply getting the referred
goods out of the market for a specific purpose, and therefore opposing the definition
of the referred concept provided in the LFCE, which states said concept in a manner
much more related to the concept of accumulation of production assets. This
7. "Article 13: The Commission shall publish on the Federal Official Gazette the methodology for the
calculation of the indices to determine the degree of concentration in the relevant market and the criteria for their
application."
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apparent contradiction regarding the different assumptions of concentration
provided in the Constitution and the LFCE, may be cleared by interpreting the latter
ordinance as a regulator of the norm provided in the first paragraph of the
Constitution, by creating a hypothesis of those conducts which may equal a
monopoly, instead of understanding that it shall regulate only those concentrations
referred to in the Constitution, Article 28, second paragraph.
The LFCE, article 16, first paragraph, defines the concept of concentration as
follows:
"Article 16: Forthe purposes of this law, concentration shall be understood as
the fusion, acquisition of control or any other act by virtue of which
corporations, associations, equity, shares, trusts or assets in general are
concentrated among competitors, suppliers, clients or any other economic
agent."
According to the provision transcribed above, the following hypothesis are
comprehended in the definition of concentration:
(i) The fusion of corporations; '
(ii) The acquisition of control over corporations or associations, 9 and
(iii) The accumulation of equity, shares, trusts or assets in general. 'o
The LFCE is silent for what regards the treatment to be given to notifications of
concentrations carried out abroad and, according to the criteria adopted by the CFC
in the years preceding 1997, all concentrations having any effect within Mexican
territory were susceptible of notification. Notwithstanding, the provision set in the
LFCE must be interpreted in the sense that a transaction is only relevant as long as
it has legal or material effects within national territory, since due to the
jurisdictional scope of the referred ordinance, it is only then that the transaction
may be considered as a concentration.
Accordingly, an international transaction may only be considered a concentration
if it conveys the acquisition of control of a Mexican entity, or the accumulation in
Mexican territory of equity, shares, participation in trusts or assets.
An example of a transaction which may not be considered as a concentration in
terms of the LFCE, article 16, is one which involves a foreign person who, having
no prior interests in Mexican territory, by means of a merger becomes the indirect
owner of a determined percentage of the shares representing the capital stock of a
Mexican corporation, as long as said percentage is not sufficient for the foreign
person to exercise control over it.
The aforementioned interpretation, has been expressly adopted in the RLFCE,
article 21, fraction I, determining the jurisdictional scope of the LFCE and hence,
renewing the criteria adopted by the CFC in the years preceding 1997.
8. Articles 222 through 228 of the Mexican General Law of Mercantile Entities, regulates the fusion as
a specific sort of merger. In this regard, being the fusion an act regulated under the laws as the outcome of the union
of one or more mercantile entities the verification of this hypothesis need convey that it be carried out among
corporations and in accordance with the aforementioned rules set in the General Law of Mercantile Entities.
9. The acquisition of control, according to various Mexican ordinances, is concretely referred to the power
to exercise decisions solely over corporations or associations.
10. The accumulation described hereto, refers to any other act which conveys bringing together the elements
fisted therein.
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CONCENTRATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In like manner to the possible conceivable contradiction existing between the
concept of concentration in the second paragraph of Article 28 of the Constitution
and the LFCE, there exists also a conceptual contrast in both ordinances for what
regards the consideration of concentrations in restraint of trade.
As exposed, according to the second paragraph of Article 28 of the
Constitution, it could be assumed that only concentrations affecting "primary
consumer goods" are prohibited, and hence the rules derived from this fundamental
hypothesis are to be limited in their regulation and are not to trespass the boundaries
set by the higher ordinance.
In this regard, the concept of concentrations in restraint of trade provided in
the LFCE would literally trespass the aforementioned boundaries creating a
loophole which would open the possibility for third party claimants to challenge the
validity of the economic competition ordinance itself, when prosecuted under it.
As stated above, the adoption of the foregoing interpretation would attend to
a literal understanding of the constitutional precept and would entail a
misconception of the legislative intention behind the regulation of trade in benefit
of competition and free concurrence. Once again, the interpretation to be embraced
resides in the prohibition of monopolies provided in the first paragraph of the cited
constitutional norm, for it sets the grounds upon which the legislative intention is
to be construed. In this sense, the enunciation provided in the second paragraph is
to be reckoned as a beacon of certain conducts and practices which among others,
are to be deemed in restraint of trade and hence forbidden by the derivative
regulating rules.
The LFCE, article 16, last paragraph, hereunder quoted, defines the
concentrations which are to be considered in restraint of trade:
"... The Commission shall challenge and penalize those concentrations which
have as an object or effect to diminish, harm or hinder competition and free
concurrence for what regards equal, similar or substantially related goods or
services"
According to the LFCE, article 17, hereunder quoted, the CFC will consider the
elements contained therein as indicia of a concentration in restraint of trade:
"Article 17.- In the investigation of concentrations, the Commission shall
consider as indicia of the hypothesis referred to in the preceding article that the
act or intended act:
"I.- Confers or may confer the person performing a fision; the acquiring
economic agent or the one resulting from the concentration, the power to
unilaterally fix prices or to substantially limit output or supply in the relevant
market, without the competing economic agents being able to, currently or
potentially, counteract said power;
"II. Has or may have as an object to unlawfully shift out other economic
agents or block their access to the relevant market; and
"ILI. Has as an object or effect to facilitate the participants in the referred
act, or intended act, the performance of the monopolistic practices referred to
on the second chapter of this law."
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The wording of the preamble of the above cited article is inaccurate, for it
mentions in a general manner those acts referred to by the preceding article, which
as exposed above, contains both what is to be understood as a concentration and the
general norm defining when such concentrations shall be deemed in restraint of
trade, nevertheless, given the scope of the article it seems obvious that it refers to
the second paragraph of the LFCE, article 16.
It is important to take account that the use of the word indicia in the referred
article would entail that there are other hypothesis, which do not appear within the
text of the economic competition ordinances, that must be verified in order for the
CFC to determine whether it is facing a concentration in restraint of trade. This
results in a situation of uncertainty, given that indicia in itself is not a basis upon
which to demonstrate that a concentration diminishes, harms, or hinders
competition and free concurrence.
Now, in relation to the contents of the fractions in article 17, it is relevant to
point out that the first two of them in themselves, do represent hypothesis which
accurately describe the cases in which a concentration may have as an object or
effect to diminish, harm or hinder competition and free concurrence for what
regards equal, similar or substantially related goods or services.
For what regards the hypothesis referred to in fraction III above I consider it
would be convenient to suppress it given the arguments exposed in the following
paragraphs.
According to Chapter II of the LFCE, there are two different sorts of
monopolistic practices, absolute and relative. In this sense, article 9 sets that
absolute monopolistic practices are those contracts, agreements, arrangements or
combinations among competitors which object or effect is to purport either (i) price
fixing; (ii) output limitation; (iii) horizontal division of markets, and (iv) bidrigging.
Likewise, article 10 states that relative monopolistic practices, are those acts which
object or effect is, or may be, to unlawfully shift other persons out of the market,
block their access, or set exclusive advantages in favor of one or several persons by
purporting: (i) vertical price fixing; (ii) resale price maintenance; (iii) tying
arrangements; (iv) exclusive dealings; (v) unilateral refusal to deal; (vi) boycott, and
(vii) any other act that unlawfully harms or hinders competition and free
concurrence in the production, processing, distribution and marketing of goods and
services, as long as it is verified that the alleged responsible has substantial power
in the relevant market.
In this sense, for what concerns the conducts considered as absolute
monopolistic practices, it is impossible that there is a causal link between them and
the execution of a concentration given that the required agreement of the former is
not consequential upon the execution of the latter.
In regard relative monopolistic practices, it is possible to assume that the
legislator intended to avoid the possibility that, as a consequence of the
concentration, the persons resulting therefrom, would acquire or increase its market
power to an extent which would allow them to cause damage when performing the
conducts classified as relative monopolistic practices. However, this is irrelevant
since the acquisition of market power is considered in fractions I and lI of article
17, making the CFC to consider the concentration, under this hypothesis, to be in
restraint of trade, without having to confirm if this situation enables the person to
execute relative monopolistic practices.
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The LFCE, article 18, quoted hereunder, sets the elements to be considered in
order to determine if a concentration is to be challenged or penalized:
"Article 18. To determine if the concentration should be challenged or
penalized in terms of this law, the Commission shall consider the following
elements:
": The relevant market, in the terms provided in article 12 of this law;
"1: The identification of the economic agents which supply the market being
treated, the analysis of their market power in the relevant market, according to
article 13 of this law, and the level of concentration in said market; and
"Ill: The rest of the criteria and analytical instruments provided in the
Regulation of this Law.""
The wording in the foreword of article 18 above is confusing, since it points out
that the elements further provided in the contents of the article are the ones to be
considered in order to determine if a concentration is to be challenged and penalized
whereas, in fact, said elements are in themselves the ones to be considered in order
to analyze the concentration.
In other words, the elements listed in article 18 are the ones used in order to get
the results upon which it is possible for the CFC to acquaint that a concentration
falls within the scope of article 17 and hence fits into the definition of a
concentration in restraint of trade provided by article 16, last paragraph.
Now, the first salient element to be considered by the CFC in the analysis of a
concentration is the relevant market, which according to the LFCE, article 12, must
be set according to the following criteria:
(i) The substitution possibilities of the good or service for other domestic and
foreign goods or services, considering the technological development, the
extent to which the consumers have substitutes and the time required for such
substitution.
(ii) The distribution costs of: (a) the good itself; (b) its relevant inputs; (c) its
accessories and substitutes from other regions and abroad, considering freight
charges, insurance, tariffs and non-tariffs restraints, restraints imposed by the
persons or its organizations, and (d) the time required to supply the market
from the aforementioned regions.
(iii) The costs and opportunities of the users or consumers to attend other markets.
11. The additional criteria and analytical instruments provided in the RLE, referred to by the LRCE,
article 18, fraction H1 are hereunder quoted:
"Article 15. To determine if a concentration should be challenged and penalized, according to
fraction M] of article 18 of the law, the following criteria shall be additionally considered:
"I: The valuation in the relevant market of the efficiency gains which, according to article 6 of
this Regulation, may derive from the concentration, which shall be asserted by the economic
agents executing it;
"I: The effects of the concentration in the relevant market regarding the rest of the competitors
and consumers of the goods or services as well as in other related markets and persons, and
"I1: The stock participation of the persons involved in the transaction in other persons
participating, directly or indirectly, in the relevant market or in related markets.
"When it is not possible to identify the indirect stockholders, this circumstance shall be duly
justified."
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(iv) The federal, local or international legal restraints limiting the access of users
or consumers to alternative supply sources or the access of the suppliers to
alternative clients.
The second salient element of analysis for the CFC, as set in article 18, fraction
II, of the LFCE, comprises the determination of the market power in terms of article
13 of said ordinance, hereunder quoted:
"Article 13: In order to determine if an economic agent has substantial power
in the relevant market, it is to be considered:
"I: Its participation in said market and if it is able to unilaterally fix prices
or to limit output in the relevant market, without the competing economic agents
being able to, currently or potentially, counteract said power;
"I1: The existence of entry barriers and the foreseeable elements which may
alter both said barriers as well as the offer of other competitors; 12
"IIh The existence and power of its competitors;
"IV: The possibilities of access ofthe economic agent and its competitors to
input sources;
"V. Its recent behavior; and
"VI: Any additional criteria set in the regulation of this law. ",,3
As it may be seen, the first element of the criteria above mentioned essentially
duplicates the content of article 17, fraction I, of the LFCE, which represents a lack
of precision since it is possible to assert that such element is in itself the essence of
market power. Hence, the referred element is the outcome which derives from the
consideration of the rest of the elements contained in article 13, above.
For what concerns the element referred to in article 18, fraction II, regarding the
level of concentration in the relevant market, the CFC shall consider the
methodology for the calculation of the indices to determine the degree of
concentration in the relevant market and the criteria for its application.
12. The RLRCE, article I1, establishes that the following elements, among others, are to be considered as
entry barriers:
(i) The financial costs;
(ii) The alternative channels development costs;
(iii) The limited access to finance, technology or efficient distribution channels;
(iv) The amount, indivisibility and recovery term of the required investment, as well as
the scarce profitability of using alternative infrastructure and equipment;
(v) The need for:. concessions, licenses, permits or any other governmental
authorization, as well as the need to obtain title to exploit intellectual property rights;
(vi) The publicity investment required for a brand or trademark to achieve an market
position that allows it to compete with brands or trademarks already positioned;
(vii) The competition limitations in the international markets;
(viii) The restraints derived from common practices of the persons already established in
the market;
(ix) The acts of federal, state and municipal authorities for what regards discrimination
when granting incentives, subsidies or support to certain producers, marketers,
distributors or service providers.
13. The additional criteria set in the regulation, referred to by the article cited above, fraction VI comprises
primarily the following elements, as set by the RLUCE, article 12:
(a) The positioning level of the goods or services in the relevant market.
(b) 'e lack of access to imports or the existence of high importation costs.
(c) The existence of high differentials in the costs faced by consumers when accessing other suppliers.
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In this regard, according to the aforementioned methodology, the indices to be
used as standards to determine the level of concentration in the relevant market are
the Herfindahl index and the Dominance index.'
PROCEDURES TO PREVENT, CHALLENGE AND PENALIZE
CONCENTRATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
There are two different procedures by which the authority acquaints the
existence of a concentration which execution should be prevented, challenged or
penalized: (i) the notification procedure, initiated by the economic agents involved
in the concentration, previous to the closing of the transaction, and (ii) the
investigation procedure, that may be initiated by the authority, ex officio, or by
affected third parties, through a law suit, against a concentration already executed.
THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE
The notification procedure has been reckoned as an efficient method for the
authority to get acquainted with concentrations which may be deemed to be in
restraint of trade, before such concentrations are accomplished.
Upon the notification the authority is able to analyze the impact of the
concentration in the market or markets which are to be affected, and in its case, take
one of three resolutions: (i) authorize the concentration; (ii) condition the
concentration, in order for it to fulfill the requirements needed to avoid threatening
competition and free concurrence in the market, I" or (iii) prohibit it.
THE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY
The obligation of the persons involved in a concentration to notify it before the
authority is founded in the LFCE, article 20, hereunder quoted:
"Article 20.- The following concentrations, prior to their accomplishment, are
to be notified before the Commission:
"'I. If the transaction is worth, in an act or a succession of acts, the equivalent of
more than 12 million times the general minimum wage valid for the Federal
District;
"Il. If the transaction implies, in an act or a succession of acts, the accumulation
of 35 per cent or more of the assets or equity of an economic agent whose assets
14. See, Diario Oficial, July 24, 1998 "Resolution on the methodology for the calculation of the indices to
determine the degree of concentration in the relevant market and the criteria for its application."
15. According to article 16 of the RLFCE, the CFC is empowered to subject the concentration to specific
conditions consisting on:
(i) The order to carry out a specific conduct, or to abstain form carrying out one;
(ii) The order to sell to third parties concrete assets, rights or stock shares;
(iii) The order upon which deletion of a specific line of products is to be executed;
(iv) The order upon which modification or deletion of certain terms and conditions part
of the act to be executed are due;
(v) The obligation to carry out actions tending to promote the participation of the
competitors in the market as well as to give access or to supply goods or services;
(vi) Any other having as an object to restrain the concentration from diminishing,
harming or hindering competition and free concurrence.
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or sales are worth more than the equivalent of 12 million times the general
minimum wage valid for the Federal District;
"Il. If in the transaction take part two or more economic agents whose assets
or annual sales, jointly or separately, are worth more than 48 million times the
general minimum wage valid for the Federal District, and said transaction
implies an additional accumulation of assets or equity superior to the equivalent
of four million eight hundred thousand times the minimum wage valid for the
Federal District."' 6
The rationale for the existence of thresholds is based on the assumption that
those concentrations which exceed the thresholds are most likely to affect the
competition and free concurrence process. Notwithstanding, a concentration not
meeting the thresholds is not necessarily considered legal per se and hence, the CFC
and interested third parties are empowered and have standing, respectively, to act
against a concentration which may be deemed unlawful by means of the
substantiation of the investigation procedure, which is exposed further in this work.
According to the rationale under which thresholds have been adopted as a legal
standard by means of which concentrations are to be notified before the CFC, said
thresholds need reflect the behavior of domestic economy in order to be accurate.
Therefore, the amounts set as thresholds in LFCE, article 20, are indexed to a
number of times worth the General Minimum Wage Valid for the Federal District
(hereinafter GMW) the day before the notification is to be filed, given that at the
time the LFCE was enacted the aforementioned index was considered as an accurate
indicator of domestic economy. Nevertheless, due to the current value of Mexican
Peso given the inflation rate prevailing since the enactment of the LFCE, and the
disparity this inflation maintains as compared to the GMW, thresholds are no longer
accurate in establishing the sort of transaction which requires notification. 7
The aforementioned situations leads to the notification of transactions which at
the time the LFCE was enacted were not reckoned as concentrations which would
require scrutiny. As a consequence, the CFC advocates a great deal of resources to
the analysis and review of the aforementioned concentrations, which in fact should
not be deemed relevant for scrutiny. Hence, it would be convenient to amend the
LFCE in order to index the thresholds for the notification of concentrations to a
more accurate sort of unit such as a UDI,'g which acknowledges the value of
inflation.
16. The prevailing valid minimum wage for the Federal District as of September, 2000 amounts $37.90
Mexican Pesos, as published in the Federal Official Gazette on December 31, 1999.
17. The difference in the value of the Mexican Peso may be represented through the following comparison:
at the time the LRE was enacted, December 24,1992, a US Dollar was worth 3.12 Mexican Pesos, according to
the exchange rate issued by Banco de Mdxico, valid for the referred date; at present, a US Dollar is worth,
approximately, 9.42 Mexican Pesos, according to the exchange rate issued by Banco de M6xico valid for September
1,2000.
18. Unit of Investment, UDI by its acronym in Spanish See "Decree establishing the obligations which may
be expressed in Units of Investment and reforms and adds diverse dispositions of the Federal Taxation Code and
the Law of the Tax on the Rent." ("Decreto por el que se establecen las obligaciones que podrdn denominarse
en Unidades de Inversidn y reforma y adiciona diversas disposiciones del Cddigo Fiscal de la Federaci6n y de
la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta.") published in the Federal Official Gazette on April 1, 1995.
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EXEMPTIONS TO THE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY
As briefly mentioned whilst explaining the concept of concentration, according
to article 21, fraction 1, of the RLFCE, transactions carried out abroad, having
effects in Mexican territory but not implying the acquisition of control of Mexican
entities or an accumulation of assets, need not be notified before the CFC, given
that said transactions do not meet the legal hypothesis of concentration set in the
LFCE. 19
Likewise, according to the RLFCE, article 21, fraction 11, corporate
reorganizations by means of which, a person has directly or indirectly, property or
possession, during the three years prior to the concentration of 98% of the capital
stock of the persons involved therein, need only file notice before the CFC within
the next five days of the closing of the concentration. This provision, which in its
conception was meant to represent a quick overlook of corporate reorganizations,
in order to meet deregulatory goals, has not had the desired effect, since the drafting
of the disposition ended up being so concrete and specific, that it is rare to fulfill the
features required by it.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The salient elements and timeframe of the notification procedure, regulated in
articles 21 of the LFCE and 20 of the RLFCE, are hereunder exposed:
(i) Filing of written statement, before the CFC, notifying the concentration;
(ii) Within the next five working days of the filing, the CFC will warn the person
notifying if any basic data and information is missing, then the person
notifying is to file the missing basic data and information within the next five
working days;
(iii) Once the notification is filed, fulfilling the basic data and information
requirements, or once these are fulfilled, within the next 20 calendar days the
CFC may request additional data and information which has to be filed within
the next 15 calendar days;
(iv) The CFC will issue a resolution within the next 45. calendar days period,
which may be extended, in exceptionally complex cases and under the
responsibility of the President of the CFC, for an additional 60 calendar days
period. The 45 calendar day period will start running at the time of the filing
of: (a) the notification, or (b) the basic data and information referred to in
paragraph (ii), or (c) the additional data and information referred to in
paragraph (iii).
(v) If no resolution is issued by the CFC upon expiration of the corresponding 45
calendar days period or its 60 calendar days extension, it shall be understood
that the CFC has no objection against the concentration.
19. "Article 21: It shall not be required to notify in terms of articles 20 and 21 of the Law:
"I: The legal acts over equity or shares of foreign legal entities, when the economic agents
involved in said acts do not acquire the control of Mexican entities, nor accumulate in national
territory equity, shares, participation in trusts or assets in general, additional to those possessed,
directly or indirectly, before the transaction, and U:
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As well as other provisions in the LFCE, certain rules governing the notification
procedure present some loopholes which together with its conception, display the
problems exposed in the following paragraphs.
Neither the LFCE nor the RLFCE grant affected third parties standing to
intervene in the procedure and, as a consequence, to appeal the decisions of the
CFC in the event a concentration is approved which would convey them damage.
In this regard, it is important to point out that, according to fraction I of article 22
of the LFCE, the only opportunity for a third party to challenge a concentration
already approved by the CFC is when the corresponding approval was granted upon
false information. Notwithstanding, in practice, the initiation of a third party action
under this hypothesis is almost impossible given that, not being part of the
procedure, the referred third parties lack access to the file and, therefore, are not
able to acquaint the information delivered to the authority by the persons filing the
notification.
The terms set for the substantiation of the procedure are extremely long for what
regards a great amount of cases which, by virtue of a simple analysis, may lead to
conclude that no harm to the competition and free concurrence process is conveyed,
such as those in which the concentration takes place among economic agents
participating in unrelated relevant markets or those in which, although the economic
agents participate in the same or related relevant markets, the increase on the market
shares, derived from the concentration, is not significant. This problem may imply
the lack of transparency in the operation of the CFC, since the economic agents
under the law may perceive that such authority, when in presence of equally simple
concentrations, for no express reason, in certain cases decides in a very short time
whereas in other cases a decision is reached consuming the whole of the
corresponding term.
The participation of the economic agents filing the notification is limited to the
delivery of data and information, not existing within the procedure a stage prior to
the decision, in which, in case the CFC intends objecting or conditioning the
transaction, the right to be heard is exercised. No assertion of dissent towards the
position adopted by the CFC is possible but until after a decision has been issued,
throughout the administrative appeal, situation which may imply, in the event the
CFC changes its view, the unnecessary delay of a favorable resolution.
A similar problem takes place when from the analysis of the concentration
derives the need to condition it and the persons notifying agree with the analysis but
not with the conditions imposed, which contents may be unilaterally determined by
the CFC. Considering that in order to reach the purpose of avoid harming to the
competition and free concurrence process, there may exist diverse options, it does
not seem reasonable that the conditions tending to achieve the aforementioned
purpose need be determined by the authority, since in most of the cases it is possible
that the economic agents involved in the concentration are able to provide
alternatives which are more convenient to their own interests and which,
simultaneously, make it less likely to safeguard competition to an extent satisfactory
for the authority. The RLFCE partially fills this gap by establishing in its article 16
that the persons filing the concentration are entitled to request the authority to
consider their proposals prior to the issuance of a decision tending to impose
conditions; nonetheless, a definite solution to the problem may only be given by the
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modification of the LFCE, since it is necessary to suspend the decision periods
while the analysis of the referred proposals is performed.
In order to counter the problems of the notification procedure described above,
a conceptual reform to it, comprising a two tier method of analysis, could be
adopted, by means of which, prior to the initiation of the procedure, a publication
in the Federal Official Gazette including the relevant data of the concentration
should be done, in order for possible affected economic agents to be part of the
procedure and making it feasible for them to challenge the final decisions of the
CFC on the matter.
The first tier would be a brief stage lasting about fifteen to twenty working days.
Within it, the CFC would analyze the concentration, acknowledging the volume and
contents of the opinions of interested third parties, regarding whether the
concentration requires further analysis and therefore needs step to the second tier
of the procedure, or whether it does not represent a threat to the competition and
free concurrence process and is to be approved. The existence of a first tier,
together with the increase in the amounts set as thresholds, resulting from the
proposed amendment to article 20 of the LFCE, would imply an important
deregulation achievement since the only concentrations which would step into the
second tier would be those from which effects in restraint of trade are perceived.
This would result in an increased efficiency in the operation of the CFC, given that
it would be able to allocate significant time solely to those concentrations really
requiring it.
The second tier of analysis would be substantiated in a period larger than the
first, since it would comprise a more extensive analysis. During this second tier, the
CFC would be empowered to request as much information as it would deem
relevant for the analysis of the concentration and the person notifying and interested
third parties would be entitled to provide evidence and to express what better serves
their interests prior to the issuance of a decision.
The decision of the authority would have to be in the sense of either approving
or objecting the concentration upon the consideration that it diminishes, harms or
hinders competition and free concurrence. In this case, a new period would start in
which the economic agents involved in the concentration would be entitled to
submit for the consideration of the CFC, and revisable by possible affected third
parties, proposals of conditions aimed to protect the competition process and
making it feasible for the concentration to be accomplished.'
THE INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
As mentioned above, the investigation procedure is an additional means to the
notification procedure, upon which, the authority is empowered to review a
concentration in order to determine if it harms competition and free concurrence
and, in its case, challenge it; not being either procedure alternative or optional over
the other. Notwithstanding that the LFCE does not contain an express provision, it
is possible to interpret such ordinance and conclude that the feasibility of one or
other procedure depends on the time of the closing of the transaction, in such a way
20. See case of concentration in the paper market in point Vi3 of this work.
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that the notification procedure is not feasible if the transaction has already been
executed.
SITUATIONS IN WHICH IT is POSSIBLE TO INITIATE AN INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
According to the above, it is acceptable to identify the following as the
hypothesis which if met make it possible to initiate the investigation procedure to
challenge and dissolve an already accomplished transaction, which may harm the
competition and free concurrence process:
(i) The concentration has not been notified because it did not exceed the
thresholds set in article 20 of the LFCE. As mentioned above, the fact that the
transaction does not exceed the thresholds is not reason enough to consider it
legal per se and hence, it may be subject of review, situation which, as
expressly contained in the LFCE, article 22, fraction 1I, may only occur within
the year following the execution of the transaction. The existence of a specific
term in which it is possible to challenge the transaction, obeys the need to
provide legal certainty to the economic agents involved in it, about the legality
of an act which has not been submitted for review.
(ii) The concentration has not been notified, breaching the obligation to do so, in
which case, a fine as a penalty for said breach is due, apart from the possible
dissolution of the concentration and of the imposition of an additional fine for
executing a forbidden concentration.
(iii) The concentration has been notified and approval has been granted by the
CFC, but said approval has been based upon false information. As exposed,
third party lawsuit in this case is practically non-operational given the lack of
access for third parties to the file.
(iv) The concentration, having been notified, has been closed prior to the
termination of the notification procedure.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The investigation procedure, as established in the LFCE, article 32, and the
RLFCE, article 23, hereunder quoted, may be initiated by two different means: (i)
ex officio, and (ii) third party lawsuit, in the following cases:
"Article 32: Any person, in the case of absolute monopolistic practices, or the
affected person in the case of any other practices and concentrations forbidden
in this law, is entitled to demand in writing, before the Commission, the person
presumed responsible, indicating what constitutes the practice or
concentration... "
"Article 23: According to Chapter V of the Law, the Commission shall
initiate an investigation when it has knowledge of facts upon which it may
deduce the probable existence of.
"I: Monopolistic practices;
"II: Forbidden concentrations referred to in article 16 of the Law, even
those which have obtained favorable resolution upon false information, or
"II: The breach on the obligation to perform the notification in terms of
article 20 of the Law.
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"In the cases of fractions I and 1 the procedure shall be initiated ex officio
with the issuance of the corresponding resolution or ex parte by filing lawsuit.
For the case offraction II, said procedure shall be initiated only ex officio. "
It is important to take account that, in essence, the analysis performed by the
CFC as. part of an investigation procedure is the same one it performs when
analyzing a concentration under the notification procedure, being the primal
difference the timeframe, which in the case of the former is quite long, and the
manner by which the CFC is able to procure itself with the relevant data and
information to carry out its analysis.
In order to expose an overview of the investigation procedure, the timeframe and
an outline of the stages which are comprised within it, are briefed hereunder:
(i) The investigation procedure begins with the issuance of a resolution initiating
the investigation. In order to acquaint possible affected third parties on the
initiation of the procedure, an abstract of the referred resolution must be
published in the Federal Official Gazette within the next ten working days
containing, at least, the concentration in restraint of trade under investigation,
and the market in which such concentration is taking place.
(ii) Upon the publication, an investigation period starts which is not to last less
than thirty nor more than ninety working days, which may be extended by the
Board of Commissioners in terms not exceeding ninety days, in exceptionally
complex cases.
(iii) Once the investigation term has expired, if there are sufficient elements to
suppose the concentration threatens competition, the CFC shall summon the
presumed responsible, or it must declare the closing of the investigation file.
(iv) Within a thirty calendar day period, the person presumed responsible shall
respond to the summons by filing and offering the corresponding evidence.
(v) The CFC shall call for the submission of final arguments (alegatos), upon
expiration of the review of evidence stage of the procedure within the next
fifteen calendar days term, or upon expiration of the thirty calendar days
period referred to in paragraph (iv) above, when the person presumed
responsible has not responded, confessed the facts or there is no evidence to
review.
(vi) Within a thirty calendar day term, the final arguments shall be substantiated
and therefore, within a sixty calendar day term, the CFC shall issue a decision.
THRD PARTY LAWSUIT
Only the persons directly affected have standing to challenge a concentration by
filing suit against it.
Some salient features of the elements the persons filing suit against a forbidden
concentration must consider are:
(i) The necessary elements to determine the relevant market and the market
power of the sued person in said market;
(ii) The assertion that the claimant is producing or intends to produce goods or
render services identical, similar or substantially related to those produced or
rendered by the persons involved in the concentration or that the claimant is
a consumer, client or supplier of the relevant market;
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(iii) If it were the case, the elements needed to determine the falsity of the
information upon which the CFC rendered approval of the concentration.
The assertion referred to in paragraph (ii) above is wide and confusing, hence a
literal interpretation might lead to conclude that even final consumers have standing
to sue against the concentration, which is contrary to the purposes of the LFCE.21
For what regards the element of standing referred to in paragraph (iii) above, as
exposed, due to the legally established confidentiality in the information filed when
notifying a concentration, it is almost impossible for a third party to get to know
precisely what parts of the information were indeed false.
PENALTIES IMPOSED TO CONCENTRATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
When in presence of a concentration in restraint of trade, as a result of the
substantiation of the investigation procedure, the CFC is.empowered to order the
divestiture of such concentration.
Additionally, the following fines may be imposed:
(i) Up to 225,000 times the GMW worth of fine for having incurred in a
forbidden concentration.
(ii) Up to 7,500 times the GMW worth of fine for participating in a forbidden
concentration in representation or by order of legal entities.
Apart from the fines above mentioned, which are necessarily related to the
existence of a concentration in restraint of trade which shall be challenged, the CFC
is empowered to impose fines for up to 7,500 times the GMW worth of fine for
having delivered false information or having declared falsely before the CFC,
regardless of the penal responsibility resulting therefrom, and for up to 100,000
times the GMW worth of fine for having breached the obligation to file notification
of a concentration.
The fines imposed as a consequence for having incurred in a forbidden
concentration, breached on the obligation to file notification, and for participating
in a forbidden concentration in representation or by order of legal entities may be
commuted when in the opinion of the CFC the violations are particularly critic, for
a fine worth up to 10% of the annual sales earned by the violator during the prior
fiscal year or up to 10% of its assets, whichever one is higher.
When imposing the aforementioned fines, the CFC shall consider, among other
criteria, the graveness of the infraction; the damage caused; the size of the affected
markets, and the duration of the concentration.
21. The purpose and effect of the LFCE, as exposed in its article of purposes and subsequently in its Article
2, differ largely from a law intended to protect consumers as a primary object: "The law proposes a policyfocused
exclusively in promoting the economic efficiency and she competitive process. In itself the law will not have any
distributive purposes. Notwithstanding that the reduction of the monopolistic power may have, and generally has,
a positive distributive effect, the latter must be reckoned as an effect of the law and not as purpose. In this manner,
it is expressly recognized that the distributive effects are pursued through other instruments offiscal and social
policies, among others, and not through the economic competition legislation. "
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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL
The administrative appeal regulated in article 39 of the LFCE, and 52 and 53 of
the RLFCE, is substantiated before the CFC and not before a higher administrative
authority. The purpose of it is to revoke, modify or confirm the appealed resolution,
and it may be filed within the next 30 working days upon receiving notification of
a resolution, against those comprising the final decision of a notification or an
investigation procedure, and the declaration of the non-notification of a
concentration or of the non-filing of a lawsuit. No incidental appeals are admitted
and solely the persons mentioned hereunder have standing to file it:
(i) Any of the persons involved in a notification procedure;22
(ii) The person presumed to be responsible as a result from an investigation
procedure, and
(iii) The person who filed lawsuit challenging an unlawful concentration.
Upon filing of the appeal, the CFC shall admit or dismiss it within the next five
working days. In the event of an admission, it shall inform it to the counterpart, in
its case, in order for it to express what better serves its interests within the next ten
working days. The CFC shall decide the appeal within the next 60 working days
term upon its filing, once it has expired, it is to be understood that the CFC confirms
its resolution.
According to the third paragraph of article 39 of the LFCE, the demand for an
appeal suspends the execution of the appealed resolution. In the case of the
resolution ordering the suspension, correction, suppression or divestiture of the
concentration and when damage may be caused to third parties, "... the appeal [sic]
will be granted to the appealing party if it provides sufficient guarantee as to
remedy and indemnify for the damages in the event it fails to get a favorable
resolution on the appeal."
The wording of the afore cited provision comprises two different matters: the
first, regarding the insertion of the expression "appeal", which would convey that
upon guaranteeing the damages, the decision of the appeal in itself would be granted
in favor of the appealing party, therefore, the expression "appeal" should read
"suspension". The second matter concerns the identification of the person having
to guarantee the aforementioned damages. The drafting "appealing party" is correct
as long as it is addressed to the person presumed responsible, but it is not so in the
presence of a third party administrative appeal, given that it would seem illogical
for a demanding party to be compelled to secure for anything which is the sole
responsibility of the demanded party.
I consider it unnecessary to have an administrative appeal of the type afore
explained applicable to the decisions reached after the whole substantiation of the
investigation procedure, since both the person presumed responsible of an unlawful
concentration and in its case the claimant party are part of an extensive procedure
by means of which both become close to the authority and have enough opportunity
to defend and challenge, correspondingly, in a wide range of moments.
22. As mentioned when explaining the notification procedure, in point V.I. of this work, third parties lack
standing to intervene in the referred procedure and so lack it as well to demand on the administrative appeal against
a concentration, regardless the decision of the CFC may convey them prejudice.
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Furthermore, it is highly improbable that the authority will drawback its decision
in a case on which it has had so much input and time for analysis as in the
investigation procedure.
In this regard, it is important to point out that the person dissenting on a
resolution of the CFC on an administrative appeal, still has standing to seek review
before the Federal Courts.
Finally, it would seem adequate for the administrative appeal to be applicable to
the notification procedure valid at present, given that the opportunity to be heard
prior to the issuance of a resolution deciding the case is non-existent in said
procedure, situation which would be alleviated through the adoption of the
amendments of the notification procedure proposed earlier in this work, given that
the relation between the person notifying, entitled third parties and the authority
would be promoted to an extent which would make it unnecessary to have an
additional decision making process before the same authority.
RELEVANT CASES
Concentration in Diverse Paper Markets: Notification23
One of the most relevant cases which have taken place in Mexico, for what
regards economic competition is undoubtedly, the concentration derived from the
international merger entered between Kimberly Clark Corp. (Kimberly) and Scott
Paper Company (Scott), both participating in the capital stock of the Mexican
companies Kimberly Clark de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (KCM) and Compafiia
Industrial San Cristobal, S.A. de C.V. (Crisoba), respectively.
The importance of this case lies in its high degree of complexity due to the
generality of the provisions of the LFCE, the non-existence of the RLFCE at the
time the concentration was reviewed and the lack of similar precedents upon which
the CFC was able to base its actions, when facing the circumstances described
hereunder.
The first circumstance was the existence of actions initiated by some of the
economic agents who considered that they might be affected as a result of the
concentration. Procter & Gamble, potential entrant to certain markets in which
KCM/Crisoba operated, filed a lawsuit against the concentration, before it was
notified by the economic agents involved therein. An action of the same kind was
initiated by Copamex, one of the main competitors of KCM/Crisoba, after the
concentration had been notified.
As exposed earlier in this document, the LFCE regulates two totally different
procedures by means of which it is empowered to review a concentration: the
investigation procedure, which may be initiated through lawsuit by any affected
third party, and the notification procedure, which must be initiated by the economic
agents involved in the concentration.
According to the above, the first of the definitions which had to be adopted in
connection with the case was one regarding the procedure which had to be followed
23. The purpose of the exposition of this case is to remark the elements related to tie procedure. The data
on the analysis of the effects of the concentration in the diverse relevant markets is contained in the Federal
Competition Commission Annual Report 1995-96, pp. 23-27.
U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL
in order to review the concentration. The CFC, upon an interpretative analysis of
the LFCE, reached the conclusion that it was not legally feasible to admit the
lawsuit filed by Proctor & Gamble, unless the concentration was executed without
it being notified by the economic agents involved therein. The rationale to hold this
position was based on the following:
(i) It is not possible to substantiate the two simultaneous procedures having the
same purpose.
(ii) It is not possible to accumulate the lawsuit and the notification given that they
are procedures of a different nature with incompatible timeframes, hence the
substantiation of only one of them is due.
(iii) The consequence of substantiating a procedure initiated through lawsuit may
only be to order the dissolution or the correction of the concentration, for
which, it is needed to face acts already accomplished.
(iv) According to the LFCE, the ad hoc procedure to review a concentration which
has not been accomplished is the notification procedure.
According to the rationale above, the CFC decided the concentration was to be
resolved through the substantiation of the notification procedure and, that only in
the event that the concentration was closed breaching the obligation to notify,24 a
lawsuit for its review would be admitted and the corresponding penalties would be
imposed.
The criteria adopted in this case was later integrated in the RLFCE, which in its
article 26, fraction IV, sets as a cause for the dismissal of a lawsuit, that a
notification procedure of a non-accomplished concentration is being substantiated
at the time the lawsuit is filed.
As it was expected, the concentration was notified and the respective procedure
was initiated. Notwithstanding that the LFCE does not recognize standing to
affected third parties in the notification procedure, the CFC considered that not only
was it fair but convenient to consider the arguments entailed in the Procter &
Gamble lawsuit and to allow this company to participate throughout the whole
process of review of the concentration. The same treatment was given to Copamex,
who also filed a lawsuit during the substantiation of the procedure. The positive
results derived from this process gave place to an express provision in the RLFCE
in the sense that nonetheless the adequacy of the dismissal of the lawsuit, according
to the preceding paragraph, the CFC must consider the arguments of the suing party
in the resolution of the notification. However, this does not mean that affected third
parties are able to challenge the decisions of the CFC, reason why the express
acknowledgment of affected third parties in the notification procedure is proposed
in this document, which implies its reformulation through amendments to the LFCE,
given that the RLFCE may not contravene it, being the latter a lower hierarchy
ordinance.
Another circumstance which complicated the process had to do with the
timeframe scheduled for the closing of the transaction at an international level. If
indeed the LFCE is explicit regarding that the concentration is to be filed prior to
24. This situation seemed remote, given that the value of the transaction notoriously exceeded the amounts
set as thresholds in article 20 of the LICE, not being foreseeable that the economic agents involved therein would
choose to breach the obligation to notify.
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its execution, it provides nothing which impedes its accomplishment before the CFC
issues a decision. Probably-due to the latter situation, the notification was filed with
short anticipation to the date scheduled for the closing of the international
transaction.
Confronted with this situation and, given that the concentration implied an
imminent threat to competition, the CFC asserted two possible alternatives: (i) the
delay on the closing of the international merger, or (ii) the suspension of its effects
in Mexico, until after having completed the corresponding analysis, and in its case,
approved the concentration.
Facing the need to safeguard the competition process, on one hand, and obeying
the purpose of not hurdling the course of the transaction in other countries, on the
other, a scheme which made it possible for the substantiation of the procedure in
Mexico without interrupting the international closing of the merger was executed.
The scheme consisted in the negotiation, issuance and execution of a consent decree
which had as an object to suspend the effects of the merger within national territory,
as well as to establish the limits which would safeguard the competition process
during the review period of the case, by setting diverse obligations to
Kimberly/Scott, among which the following stand out: the deposit of the shares
representing the capital stock of Crisoba owned by Scott, in a financial institution
which would have to exercise the voting rights until the concentration was
approved, in its case; the obligation to instruct the financial institution to sell the
shares, in the event that the CFC decided to object the concentration; and the
prohibition to Kimberly/KCM to access information of Crisoba during the review
of the concentration.
The third circumstance is related to the results of the analysis of the effects of the
concentration. The transaction implied a substantial increase in the concentration
indices of some products; in Mexico; nevertheless, not all the markets in which
KCM and/or Crisoba participated registered levels which called for the total
objection of the transaction.
The final result of the analysis set the need to take, for the first time in the then
brief history of the CFC, a decision in the sense of approving the concentration
conditioning it to the sale of an important part of the assets of the companies.
Notwithstanding, although the LFCE empowers the CFC to unilaterally establish
the conditions, a process for the review of the proposals of the economic agents
involved in the concentration to neutralize its negative effects was instrumented,
and participation was given to the current and potential competitors. Upon this
experience, the integration in the RLFCE of a provision in the sense of providing
the notifying parties the opportunity to file condition proposals before the CFC
issues a conditioned resolution, was promoted. Notwithstanding, as mentioned when
exposing the notification procedure earlier in this work, the substantiation of this
stage would require amending the LFCE.
Facing the lack of a legal framework to substantiate this procedure, the proposals
were reviewed in the remaining timeframe available, considering the limits
established by the terms set in the LFCE for the issuance of a decision, in such a
manner that, with the consent of the persons notifying the concentration and of
affected third parties, a decision setting the general guidelines for the divestiture,
which had to be carried out within a one year period, was reached. As well,
Kimberly was imposed a thirty day term to submit for the consideration of the CFC
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the detailed scheme upon which the divestiture would take place, subjecting the
validity of the decision to the approval of the definitive scheme.
The measures adopted in the substantiation of this procedure allowed to reach a
resolution which safeguarded the competition process, with no further challenges
from the persons involved. Nonetheless, I consider it convenient to restate the need
for a reform to the LFCE in order to grant standing to interested third parties and
to institutionalize the methods required to hear both these and the persons notifying
before the issuance of a decision.
Concentration in the Tequila and Agave Markets. Lawsuit and Notification of
Concentratio,
25
On July, 1999, affected third parties filed suit before the CFC, in order to
challenge the acquisition of 99.9 per cent of the capital stock of Romo Hermanas,
S.A. de C.V. which owned 49.8 per cent and 50 per cent of Tequila Herradura, S.A.
de C.V. and Comercializadora Herradura, S.A. de C.V. (both companies referred
jointly as Herradura), correspondingly, on the following arguments:
(i) The transaction implied a concentration among Herradura and Josd Cuervo,
S.A. de C.V. and its affiliate companies (all of them referred to jointly as
"Cuervo") in terms of article 16, first paragraph of the LFCE, since the
familiar links among the person who holds control of Romo Hermanas,
S.A. de C.V. and the person who holds control of Cuervo.
(ii) Although Romo Hermanas, S.A. de C.V., did not have the in-law control
of Herradura, it did have the virtual control of them given that the
remaining 50.2 per cent and 50 per cent of the capital stock of the
corporations of such group is distributed among other two individual
shareholders, situation which does not guarantee that the referred remaining
shares are to be voted in the same manner.
(iii) Cuervo is a group of companies which participate with the largest share in
the market in which Herradura participates. The links between Cuervo and
Herradura derived from the concentration represented an imminent harm
to the competition and free concurrence process given the non-competition
incentives among both groups.
Upon the considerations afore described, the suing parties exposed the analysis
of the contents of article 18 of the LFCE, in order to demonstrate that the hypothesis
contained in article 17 of said ordinance were met, and so the concentration should
be challenged and penalized.
The first part of the analysis comprises the determination of the relevant market
according to the LFCE, article 12, upon which, the relevant product is the alcoholic
beverage "tequila", name protected under a geographic distinctive mark which
provides that only those alcoholic beverages produced with a plant known as agave
tequilana weber, blue variety, which can only be found in the state of Jalisco and
certain municipalities of the states of Guanajuato, Michoacan, Nayarit and
Tamaulipas are to bear the referred name. Likewise, tequila may be named
25. See Federal Competition Commission at www.cfc.gob.mx/cfc99e/Resoluciones/concentraciones/
Marzo2000/ROMO.htm. The data and information is presented in the terms it was filed by the suing parties. Thus,
it may present some differences in comparison to the one published by the CFC.
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according to the quantity of "agave" used in its production. In this regard, it is
possible to have 'Tequila 100% of "agave.... (T100) or plain "Tequila" which is
produced with at least 51% of "agave" as primal input.
The tequila market is an isolated one which admits no substitutes, mainly
because, as mentioned above, it is an alcoholic beverage produced under a
geographic distinctive mark which imposes specific conditions for its production,
as well, because international producers and distributors of alcoholic beverages are
interested in having, among their products lines, tequila given that it is a specifically
demanded brand, and finally, because products such as Mezcal, which is similar to
tequila in various aspects, is not considered as a substitute by consumers, which can
be clearly stated by the low market penetration that said spirit has had, though being
.considerably less costly.
The geographic area which composes the relevant market comprises Mexico and
abroad, given that approximately 50 per cent of the tequila production is destined
to its exportation to more than forty countries around the world.
According to article 18 of the LFCE, the next element to be analyzed is the
determination of substantial power of the economic agents involved in the
transaction, in terms of article 13 of the LFCE, which embraced the considerations
described in the paragraphs that follow.
The tequila producers market structure on 1998 resulted in 54 tequila producers,
of which, four concentrated 57 per cent of the market, among which were Cuervo
holding 18.31 per cent, and Herradura holding 8.88 per cent. On 1999, the tequila
market structure presented a 6.8 per cent increase for what regarded the four main
producers, resulting in the said main producers concentrating 63.8 percent of the
market with Cuervo holding 29.4 percent and Herradura holding 8.8 per cent.
The analysis of the Herfindahl (H) and the Dominance (D) indices, as required
in the LFCE, articles 18, fraction I and 13, fraction I, was performed for what
regards sales in value within the domestic market, resulting in a concentration of
662 points, with an absolute value of 2,262 points for what concerns the H index,
and a concentration of 1,720 points, with an absolute value of 4,390 in the case of
the D index. These results exceed the maximum levels set to assert the competitive
operation of the market, 2,000 points in the H index, and 2500 points in the D
index.
Subsequently, the analysis referred to above was performed from the volume
(liters) of sales per economic agent, resulting in the concentration having negative
effects since in the H index presented an increase of 591 points with a 2,065 points
total value, whereas D index increases 1,562 points with a 4,403 points total value.
Thirdly, the production per economic agent was considered, resulting in the H
index being shifted 524 points, resulting in 1,937 points total value while the D
index shifted 1,704 points to produce a total value of 1,390 points. It is important
to point out, that although for what regards the H index, the maximum level was not
exceeded by the resulting absolute value, it must be considered that small tequila
producers which lack financial strength and prestigious trademarks sell their
product to Cuervo, becoming manufacturers of it. In this sense, if the analysis were
to incorporate the production of the persons producing for Cuervo the result of the
analysis would clearly exceed the maximum level set.
Finally, the analysis of the exports market reveals, once again, the threat that the
concentration poses to competition. The H index is moved up 79 points, with an
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absolute value of 2,232 points while the D index is raised 131 points and its
absolute value reaches 5,878 points. The exports market analysis is important given
that the economic agent who gets to have market power in such portion of the
market is to have significant advantages which will allow it to drive its competitors
out of the market.
Another element to determine substantial power in the relevant market, as
established in article 13 of the LFCE, are the barriers to entry, among which the
following are worth mentioning. One of the main barriers to entry is the existence
of well known trademarks which absorb most of the domestic demand. In this
respect, it is important to point out that the main tequila producers have achieved
to gain a reputation throughout decades, which allows them to have public goodwill,
whereas new producers represent a "risky" alternative for the consumer. As a
consequence, the new market niches may be occupied by the brands already
established in a faster and easier manner, as compared to younger trademarks.
As well, the entry to the tequila market may purport the investment of large
amounts of resources, when selling a costly product at a price lower than that its
competitors get due to selling in a market in which they are already established, or
because of high publicity expenditures. Hence, for instance, Herradura has been
able to keep remarkably low publicity costs while simultaneously registering
radically high sales.
Given that the economic agents involved in the concentration are two of the
tequila producers with greatest goodwill through their trademarks, it was
undesirable for them to merge since that would raise the barrier to entry to an even
higher level and furthermore it would expose competitors to be shifted out of the
market, which would probably end up in higher prices to consumers and a reduction
in the alternatives faced by them.
Another barrier to entry to be acknowledged, is the restrained access that tequila
producers have to "agave", the essential input. As exposed, tequila is a name
protected under a geographic distinctive mark which purports that it may only be
produced from the "agave" harvested in certain areas of Mexico. Additionally,
around 25 per cent of the "agave" plants are infected with a long-term plague for
which, at present, no cure has yet been developed and which conveys the use of
more "agave" plants than would normally be necessary for the elaboration of the
same volume of tequila. In order to illustrate the aforementioned situation,
currently, the average kilograms needed to produce a liter of tequila is 6.5 kg/Il,
while in 1995 the average kilograms of "agave" needed to produce a liter of tequila
was 4.8 kilograms.
Given the market conditions for what concerns access to "agave", the majority
of the tequila producers have tried to enter into as much supply agreements as
possible, purchasing future crops, which entail buying "agave" plants one cr two
years of age, when the optimal maturity is reached at eight or ten years of age. In
this regard, "agave" farmers are reluctant to enter into this sort of agreements given
that the "agave" price keeps rising, situation which incentives them to wait for the
best moment to sell. Thus, those tequila producers which do not have "agave"
supply guaranteed find it very hard to enter the referred future agreements,
pressuring them to buy in the spot market, which entails extremely high costs due
to the situation of scarcity. In this regard, it is important to point out that tequila
[Vol. 9
Spring 2001] MEXICAN ECONOMIC COMPETITION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 81
producers such as Cuervo and Herradura have most of their "agave" needs already
covered through agreements with diverse companies.
An additional factor, which allows exporting tequila producers to obtain
extraordinary gains is the brokerage systems generally used to market tequila
abroad. Tequila producers enter into reciprocal exclusivity agreements with
companies which are in charge of marketing in the main exports markets. Said
marketing companies control considerable percentages of the wines and spirits
markets. Exclusivity abroad allows for a strong differential between exports and
domestic prices, by eliminating the arbitrageur mechanisms which would reduce
said differentials. Exclusive agreements block other companies access to this
distribution channels.
Economic barriers to exports, also represent hurdles for small and medium
companies to carry out sales abroad, which sets a competitive advantage of the
exporting tequila producers over the non-exporting ones. New competitors in
opposition to large producers face adverse finance conditions for what regards the
obtainment of work and investment credits, while large producers are able to access
international credits at relatively low interest rates. Small competitors with no
access to external markets have as an only option to get domestic credits under high
interest rates and with extremely short maturity terms or, in the worst of the cases,
there is no possibility to access the required operational capital.
According to fractions II and IV of article 13 of the LFCE, the next two
elements to consider imply analyzing the existence and power of competitors and
the access to inputs, respectively, both which have already been analyzed while
exposing the market structure and the barrier to entry raised by "agave".
According to the foregoing analysis, it is possible to conclude that the
concentration would verify the hypothesis set in article 17 of the LFCE and
therefore, it meets the definition of a forbidden concentration in terms of article 16
of the referred ordinance.
Herradura and Cuervo would increase their market power both in the relevant
market as well as in the "agave" market. The concentration would grant the persons
involved therein enough market power to influence the final price of tequila, since
at present they hold 37 per cent of the total domestic market sales, more than 65 per
cent of the sales of the medium and high price segments, and 41 per cent of exports.
This, regardless of the automatic concentration derived from the scarcity in the
"agave".
In this last regard, both Cuervo and Herradura would be empowered in-fact to fix
"agave" prices to such an extent that it would be likely for competitors to be unable
to face the spot market prices. Influencing its competitors inputs prices would allow
Cuervo and Herradura to strangle them, given that the former would only have two
possible selling actions: sell at prices above Cuervo and Herradura in order to
reflect the "agave" price increase and accept the consequent market share loss in
favor of the concentrating producers, or to maintain competitive prices and confront
financial and economic losses at least for five years more. In either case, results in
the medium run would inevitably be a substantial increase in the market
concentration due to the accelerated disappearance of competitors.
For what regards persons demanding the product, this would have to meet tequila
price fixing, which in an incipient stage might be manipulated by Cuervo and
Herradura in order to represent a stability. Eventually, said prices would be
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increased up to the point which would allow the referred producers to maximize the
quasi-monopolistic gains, at least in the price segments and in the distribution
channels where Cuervo and Herradura have major joint impact. Likewise, the
consumers could face a strong reduction in the products choices due to the
vanishing and close of tequila producers.
The effects of the concentration in other related markets and economic agents
would necessarily affect "agave" farmers and tequila brokers, given that once the
market shares are added, the concentrating persons would be able to raise "agave"
prices temporarily in order to eliminate a significant part of the competition and
therefore strengthen its role in the market setting the conditions for trade in the
medium and long run. To the same extent the concentration may affect brokers
which at certain point would be compelled to grant anti-competitive preferences and
special advantages to Cuervo and Herradura due to their weight in the tequila sales
in their stores and the importance of brands in this market.
As a consequence, the concentration would have as an effect that Cuervo and
Herradura would shift as many competitors as possible by manipulating prices of
the input and the final products, and following would obtain additional gains from
the consumers, tequila brokers and "agave" harvesters.
On October 1999, the CFC decided to challenge the concentration, ordering its
divestiture. Notwithstanding, said decision was adopted as a result of the
notification filed by the economic agents involved in the transaction instead of the
investigation procedure initiated as a consequence of the lawsuit afore described.
In this regard, it is important to point out that prior to the filing of the lawsuit but
once the concentration had already been executed, the aforementioned notification
was filed extemporaneously before the CFC, which admitted it and moved on to its
analysis, despite the fact that what would have been legally proper, as exposed
earlier in this document, would have been the initiation of an investigation
procedure, given that the concentration had been previously executed.
Notwithstanding the notification procedure had been initiated, the lawsuit had to
be admitted given that, according to the RLFCE, article 26,26 the CFC was not
empowered to dismiss the lawsuit filed against the concentration, since if it would
have done so, it would have denied suing parties its right to initiate an action against
a concentration in restraint of trade, granted in articles 32 of the LFCE, and 23 of
the RLFCE. As a consequence, the CFC substantiated both procedures
simultaneously.
26. "Article 26: The Commission shall reject the complaint as being clearly contrary to law, when:
"I. The reported facts are not considered pursuant to the Law to be monopoly practices or
prohibited concentrations;
"11l. The facts and conditions in the indicated relevant market have already been subject to a
judgment in terms of Article 33 of the Law;
"IM. Proceedings are pending before the Commission in reference to the same facts, after having
issued a summons against the alleged violator,
"IV. There are notification proceedings already under way regarding of a concentration which
has still not taken place. In this case the Commission shall take into consideration the elements
contributed in the complaint in order to resolve the notified concentration; nevertheless, the
complainant shall not have access to the documentation relating to the said concentrations nor
shall be entitled to question the proceedings, and
"V. When the reported facts are not likely to take place in the near future."
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For the sake of fastness, the authority decided to substantiate the analysis of the
concentration through the notification procedure given the timeframe to decide is
clearly shorter than that of the investigation procedure, and so, it proceeded to close
the investigation procedure file, on the grounds that the matter of the controversy
had already been resolved according to the claims of the suing parties and hence,
the investigation procedure had no further object.
Since it was quite clear that the persons involved in the concentration would file
an administrative appeal against the decision of the authority, the suing parties,
although in accordance with the decision of the CFC on the divestiture, challenged
the decision on the closing of the investigation file in order to maintain standing in
case the authority changed its view and revoked the divestiture decision.
As a result of the substantiation of the administrative appeal filed by the parties
involved in the transaction, the CFC confirmed its decision on the divestiture.
Therefore the suing parties decided not to move towards further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The LFCE represents the most important advance undertaken in Mexico towards
the efficient execution of an antitrust policy. Seven years since its enactment there
exists now practical experience which allows to define certain reforms in order to
improve its enforcement. Some of these reforms have to do with the regulation
governing concentrations, being the most important the one in connection to the
notification procedure, which would have to include, as a fundamental aspect, the
granting of standing to affected third parties and the methods to hear both the
persons notifying as well as said third parties. This would allow for a greater
transparency and quality in the analysis of the effects of concentrations and a
broader efficacy in the prevention of those in restraint of trade.

